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I.

INTRODUCTION

As I leave my house, I go through the same mental checklist to
make sure that I have everything I need for my day: keys, wallet
and, most importantly, cell phone. Cell phones have become part of
our everyday lives; an extension of our bodies. Oftentimes, it seems
like we cannot function without our cell phones. It feels as though
a part of us is missing if we inadvertently leave our cell phone at
home. However, as commonplace and helpful as a cell phone has
become, can the information transmitted and obtained by this 2” x
5” object severely infringe upon our privacy rights? Can this
information constitute crucial evidence of the guilt or innocence of
an individual in a criminal investigation?
The need for police to obtain search warrants for prolonged
searches of cell phone data is increasing in our society where
everyone is so dependent on his or her cell phone. 1 Moreover, with
1. Pew Research Center reported that “64% of American adults now own a
smartphone of some kind.” Aaron Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER (Apr. 1, 2015), www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-sma
rtphone-use-in-2015/. Moreover, “15% of Americans age 18-29 are heavily
dependent on a smartphone for online access.” Id.; see generally Shannon L.
Noder, Note, Talking and Texting While Driving: A Look at Regulating Cell
Phone Use Behind the Wheel, 44 VAL. U.L REV. 237, 239-43 (2009) (discussing
the increase in cell phone ownership and use).
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this dependency on technology, it is increasingly necessary to
depart from current rules. These rules are encompassed in the
Third-Party Doctrine and the Stored Communications Act. 2 Under
the Third-Party Doctrine, information revealed to a third party can
be conveyed to the government without violating the Fourth
Amendment.3 The Stored Communications Act is a statute enacted
by Congress which gives some protections to electronic information
stored with third parties.4
Part II of this comment begins with a discussion of the
development of the Fourth Amendment from its inception to the
present.5 Further, it demonstrates the tension between the Fourth
Amendment and the development of technology, with a particular
focus on cell phone location data. 6 Part III of this comment then
discusses whether there is a Fourth Amendment violation when a
police officer conducts a prolonged search of cell phone location data
without a search warrant.7 Part III of this comment also analyzes
how the Third-Party Doctrine and the Stored Communication Act
affect cell phone location data searches. Additionally, when
addressing the reasonableness of the prolonged search of cell phone
location data without a warrant, this comment looks at whether the
balance of interest tips in favor of the legitimate government
interests or the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.8 Part
IV of this comment proposes that changes to the Stored
Communications Act and Third-Party Doctrine can preserve an
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in accordance with
the Fourth Amendment.

II. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment places restraints on the government
whenever the government seeks to search or seize a person or
property.9 Since its ratification in 1791, the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment continues to evolve.10 With the development of
technology, the meaning of what constitutes an unreasonable
search or seizure is also changing.

2. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712
(2012).
3. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2012).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d. 332, 345 (4th Cir. 2015)
7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999).
9. Barry Friedman and Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment, NATIONAL
CONSTITUTION CENTER (May 12, 2017), https://constitutioncenter.org/interacti
ve-constitution/amendments/amendment-iv.
10. Id.
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The Development of the Fourth Amendment

The Constitutional Amendments guarantee individuals
certain personal freedoms and, at the same time, place limitations
on the State and Federal Government’s powers. 11 The Fourth
Amendment is no exception.12 The Fourth Amendment states that
[T]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.13

There are two general ways that the Fourth Amendment has
been interpreted: a one clause interpretation or a two clause
interpretation.14 The majority reading follows the one clause
interpretation and maintains that in order to have a reasonable
search or seizure, the government needs to properly execute a
warrant.15 A warrant is properly executed when there is probable
cause.16 Alternatively, the minority reading of the Fourth
Amendment follows the two clause interpretation. 17 The two clause
interpretation asserts that searches and seizures have to be
reasonable and if a warrant is required, it must be based upon
probable cause.18
Regardless of the method of interpretation, after the
prosecution has satisfied its burden of proof, there are several steps
a defendant must establish before a court will hold that the methods
11. In 1787 through 1788, in order for James Madison to gain support for
the ratification of the Constitution, he had to compromise with the AntiFederalists and promise to add a Bill of Rights to the Constitution. Akhil Reed
Amar, The Bill of Rights and The Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193,
1202 (1992). The Anti-Federalists were adamant about the inclusion of a Bill of
Rights because they sought to limit the power of the federal government and to
preserve the liberty of individuals and of the States. Id.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
13. Id.
14. Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Fourth Amendment’s Two Clauses, 26 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1389, 1389-90 (1989). There have been many discussions as to
how to interpret the overall premise of the Fourth Amendment. Id. In
determining whether or not a search and seizure is reasonable, a court must
balance “the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.” New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985). A court must look at the context
within which the search or seizure took place. Id. at 337.
15. Wassterstrom, supra note 14.
16. Id. Probable Cause is a “fluid concept—turning on the assessment of
probabilities in a particular factual context.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232
(1983).
17. Wassterstrom, supra note 14.
18. Id. A warrant is reasonable if there is probable cause to believe that a
certain item will be found in a certain location. Camara v. Mun. Ct. of S.F., 387
U.S. 523, 535 (1967). For example, it would be reasonable to look for a sixtyinch television in a closet, but it would be unreasonable to look for a sixty-inch
television inside a dresser drawer. Id.
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used by a police officer violated the Fourth Amendment and order
the suppression of the evidence obtained from the search. 19 First, a
defendant must show that there was, indeed, a search or a seizure. 20
Then, the defendant must show that the search or seizure was
performed without any probable cause, which makes the search or
seizure unreasonable.21 Finally, the defendant must show that even
if the search or seizure was unreasonable, there are no exceptions
that would make a search or seizure reasonable.22
If a defendant proves all three of these contentions, then the
evidence may be suppressed.23 The exclusion of evidence is intended
to “cure the invasion of the defendant’s rights which he has already
suffered.”24 The purpose of suppressing evidence obtained from an
unlawful search or seizure is to deter police misconduct and
encourage the police to obtain a warrant. 25 The exclusion of
19. Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment:
A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 682 (2011); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 657-58 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained by an illegal search or
seizure should be excluded in a criminal trial in both federal and state
prosecutions).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21. Id.
22. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978)
23. The exclusionary rule is a rule which states that “evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding
against the victim of the illegal search or seizure.” U.S. v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 347 (1974); In Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 553, 573 (2004) (holding that
since the warrant was “obviously deficient” due to the clerical error of the police
officer, it is “presumptively unreasonable” and thus invalid). In Ramirez, the
police officer relied on his own errors, and not on a neutral and unbiased Judge.
Id. at 553, 573. The Supreme Court seeks to deter this kind of behavior and
error. Id. Due to the high cost of excluding evidence, the exclusionary rule is one
possible remedy, but it is not automatic. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
932 (1984). The Supreme Court in Calandra, stated that the exclusionary rule
is “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional
right.” Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348. Therefore, the “courts are not subject to any
direct constitutional duty to exclude illegally obtained evidence, because the
question of admissibility of such evidence is not addressed by the [Fourth]
Amendment.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 932.
24. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976). The exclusionary rule is a
remedy to violations of the Fourth Amendment. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657. The
exclusionary rule states that fruits of an unconstitutional search or seizure can
be inadmissible in court. Id. at 658.
25. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to encourage police officers to be
reasonable and deter police misconduct. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916. Police officers
may have an incentive to be aggressive in order to make an arrest and the
exclusionary rule is a remedy that seeks to prevent this misconduct from
happening. Id. at 916-19. Moreover, a warrant acts like an insurance policy for
a police officer because a police officer has the issuing Judge’s determination of
probable cause to fall back upon if the warrant is later deemed invalid. Id. at
922. The exclusionary rule is a remedy only to deter police misconduct. Id. at
916. It does not deter mistakes made by the issuing judge or magistrate. Id.
This is because the issuing judge or magistrate is viewed as a neutral third
party with no bias. Id. at 917. Therefore, even if the warrant is deemed
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evidence, however, places substantial social costs on the State. 26
One such social cost is that the exclusion of evidence inhibits the
truth finding process of the criminal justice system. 27 Therefore,
there exists a delicate balance between these two competing
interests and evidence will only be suppressed when there is a
tangible benefit.28
This section demonstrates that throughout the years, the
meaning of what constitutes a reasonable search and seizure has
been continually changing.29 The Fourth Amendment was first
established to prevent a powerful government from issuing broad
sweeping general warrants.30 In particular, the Supreme Court
initially interpreted the Fourth Amendment as protecting
individuals from unreasonable physical intrusion upon individuals’
real property.31 Then, beginning during the time that Earl Warren
became Chief Justice,32 the Supreme Court greatly expanded the

unreasonable, the evidence obtained by the unreasonable warrant will still be
allowed in a criminal prosecution if the warrant is issued by a judge. Id.
26. United States v. Payber, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980).
27. Id. at 734.
28. Id. The Court in Calandra stated, “the application of the [exclusionary]
rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought
most efficaciously served.” Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348; see generally Sarah L.
Dickey, Comment, The Anomaly of Passenger “Standing” to Suppress all
Evidence Derived from Illegal Vehicle Seizures Under the Exclusionary Rule:
Why the Conventional Wisdom of the Lower Courts is Wrong, 82 MISS. L.J. 183,
188 (2013) (explaining the role of the exclusionary rule in deterring police
misconduct).
29. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 465-66 (1928); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
30. General warrants were used by England to help enforce British
mandates. Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth
Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, n. 142 (1988). (“Searches
and seizures pursuant to general warrants represented the sort of unreasonable
conduct prohibited by the [Fourth] amendment’s first clause” because general
warrants gave those executing the warrant broad power.) Id. at 82. This is
because the warrant did not specify what locations were to be searched or what
items were to be seized. Id.
31. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465-66. The Supreme Court noted that simply
placing a listening device on a public telephone pole was not a violation of the
Fourth Amendment because the government did not go onto the individual’s
property. Id. There was no trespass and therefore there was no search. Id.
Moreover, since the thing acquired by the government were words spoken, there
was nothing seized since words are intangible. Id. at 465. Olmstead is
distinguishable from Silverman v. U.S., 365 U.S. 505, 510 (1961). In Silverman,
the Supreme Court held that placing a microphone into the foundation of the
Defendant’s home is a physical invasion. Id. Therefore, it constituted a trespass
because the microphone was placed on the Defendant’s property. Id.
32. The Warren Court refers to the time period in which Justice Earl Warren
served as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Justice Warren served as
Chief Justice from 1953 through 1969. Sumi Cho, Symposium: Redeeming
Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren, Brown, and a Theory of
Racial Redemption, 40 B.C.L. REV 73, 73 (1998). This Court is oftentimes
characterized by its “liberal judicial activism.” Id.
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protections afforded to criminal defendants in regards to searches
and seizures.33 For example, during this time, the Supreme Court
increased the number of situations that required warrants for a
valid search or seizure.34 The Warren Court also established the
idea that the Fourth Amendment, through the warrant
requirement, guarantees and protects an individual’s right to
privacy.35 Specifically, the Fourth Amendment “protect[s] what a
person seeks to preserve as private.” 36
Following the Warren Court, the Supreme Court under Chief
Justice Warren Burger began to limit the protections enjoyed by
criminal defendants in favor of the government’s legitimate State
interest.37 Specifically, the Supreme Court increased the
33. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. In Katz, the Supreme Court stepped away from
the concept of trespass as the only violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion established a two-part test for determining
a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 361. This test states that first, “a
person must have a subjective expectation of privacy in the communication”
and, second, “the expectation must be objectively reasonable.” Id.; see also
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 407 (2012) (holding that trespass, with
the intent to gain information, is still a violation of the Fourth Amendment); see
also Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (holding that an
unlicensed physical intrusion upon individual’s property and intent by police
officers to gain information violates the Fourth Amendment). Therefore, Katz
and Jones stand for the proposition that there are two ways to violate the
Fourth Amendment: by a physical intrusion on an individual’s property with
the intent of gaining information and by impinging on a person’s reasonable
expectation of privacy. Jones, 565 U.S. at 407; Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
34. The Warren Court was typically pro-defense, and this can be seen
through the Court’s various decisions in criminal cases. Once such example is
in Chimel v. California, in which the Court held that without a search warrant
it was unreasonable to extend the area a police officer can search to the entire
house. 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969). This is because it is unreasonable for a
defendant to be able to reach a weapon that is not within his immediate reach.
Id. Thus, since the safety of the police officer was not at risk, the search, done
without a warrant, was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
35. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 351 (1928). Although the
Fourth Amendment does not specifically mention privacy, the Supreme Court
has read a privacy requirement within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
36. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 351 (stating that “[t]he Fourth Amendment
preserves people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not subject of Fourth Amendment protection…
[b]ut what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected.”).
37. The Burger Court was typically pro-state, and this can be seen through
its various decisions in criminal cases. Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court
Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away: The Century of Fourth Amendment
“Search and Seizure” Doctrine, 100 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 933, 993, 997
(2010). Many exceptions to otherwise unreasonable searches and seizures were
developed in order to restrict the ability to suppress evidence. Id. at 997-98. For
example, in United States v. Leon, the Supreme Court held that while there was
an illegal search and seizure because there was not enough evidence to
constitute probable cause. 468 U.S. 897, 920 (1984). However, suppression was
not an appropriate remedy because the police officer relied in good faith on the

2017]

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in a Cell Phone Age

561

availability of warrant exceptions so that a police officer may
execute more lawful searches and seizures without a warrant. 38 As
it stands now, a reasonable search or seizure generally requires an
officer to obtain a warrant, unless the circumstances fall within
certain, specific warrant exception.39

B.

The Tension Between the Fourth Amendment and
the Development of Technology

The meaning of the Fourth Amendment has evolved from a
protection of physical property to a protection of privacy rights. 40
The rise of cell phone technology changed and will continue to
change how the Fourth Amendment applies to criminal
defendants.41 This is because the protections allowed by the Fourth
Amendment do not operate in the conventional manner in regards
to the data stored and transmitted by a cell phone.42 The type of
data stored in cell towers by cell phone service providers involves

Judge’s decision regarding probable cause when issuing the warrant. Id. The
Court further decided that expanding the exclusionary rule to include these
types of situations would not deter police officers from overextending their
authority because police officers should rely on judicial determinations. Id. at
921. Thus, the Supreme Court created a good-faith exception to a warrant
requirement. Id. at 920.
38. See generally Criminal Law Review: Featured Contributors: The U.S.
Supreme Court Gets it Right in Arizona v. Gant: Justifications for Rules Protect
Constitutional Rights, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 532 (2011) (discussing different
warrant exceptions). For example, the Supreme Court has held that a police
officer may require an individual to step out of his or her car, thus seizing the
individual, during a routine stop. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 113
(1977). The Supreme Court further held that a full search of an individual
incident to a lawful custodial arrest is “not only an exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment but is also a reasonable search under
that Amendment.” U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
39. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014). Courts encourage the
use of warrants because this “ensures that the inferences to support a search
are drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Id. An
example of a warrant exception is an emergency in which a police officer must
act quickly and cannot wait for a warrant to be executed. Kentucky v. King, 563
U.S. 452, 460 (2011); see also Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)
(reviewing past Supreme Court holdings regarding warrant exceptions); see
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1978) (holding that “the need to protect
or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be
otherwise illegal.”). The Court in Mincey gave several other examples of
situations that do not need a warrant such as “when the police come upon the
scene of a homicide they may make a prompt warrantless search of the area to
see if there are other victims or if a killer is still on the premise.” Id. at 392.
40. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457 (1928); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
41. Id.; Olmstead, 177 U.S. at 457, 465-66.
42. Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third Party
Doctrine Should Not Apply, 54 B.C.L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2013).
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information about communication, which includes the location of
the user.43 Whenever a cell phone is turned on, the cell phone
“communicates” every few minutes with a nearby cell site.44 The
communication is called Cell-Site Location Information, or CSLI. 45
By identifying the cell site which is activated, the approximate
location of the cell phone and its user can be ascertained at specific
points in time.46 In urban areas, with many cell towers, the location
of a cell phone can be located within a range of about 200 feet. 47
This location identification gives the government a plethora of
information regarding an individual and his or her whereabouts at
any given time.48 Given the immense reliance on cell phones today,
this means that the government can use this technology to gain
information whenever the cell phone is turned on, which in most
cases that means twenty-four-hours a day, seven-days-a-week.49
Further, since a cell phone is likely to always be with an individual,
the government can also gain information regarding the exact
location of that individual.50
Common law dictates that when an individual voluntarily
discloses information to another third party, that person loses any
reasonable expectation of privacy he or she may have in that
information.51 This is because the individual is allowing others
access to otherwise private information. 52 The information
communicated to the third party can therefore be obtained without
a warrant because there is no longer any expectation of privacy that
would otherwise protect that information. 53 This concept is known

43. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d. 332, 343 (4th Cir. 2015). The cell
tower captures this information by identifying the cell tower with which the
connection was made. Id.
44. Id.
45. Eric Lode, Validity of Use of Cellular Telephone or Tower to Track
Prospective, Real Time, or Historical Position of Possessors of Phone Under
Fourth Amendment, 92 A.L.R. FED 2D. 1, 2 (2015).
46. Graham, 796 F.3d at 434.
47. Lode, supra note 45, at 2.
48. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2473 (2014).
49. Graham, 796 F.3d at 350; see generally Christopher Fox, Checking In:
Historic Cell Site Location Information and the Stored Communications Act, 42
SETON HALL L. REV. 769, 769-70 (2012) (discussing the increased use of cell
phones).
50. Id. at 773-75.
51. Id.
52. Id. This concept is exemplified by the case of United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 443, 435 (1976). In this case, the Court held that since the Defendant
voluntarily gave his records to his bank, he had no Fourth Amendment
protection as to those documents. Id. at 443. It must further be noted that since
the time that the Supreme Court decided Miller, Congress has enacted a statute
which gives Fourth Amendment protection to bank customers. Aditi A. Prahbu,
Contracting for Financial Privacy: The Rights of Banks and Customers Under
the Reauthorized Patriot Act, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 51, 65 (2007).
53. Bedi, supra note 42, at 2; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
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as the Third-Party Doctrine.54 This common law principle creates
an inherent problem with regards to cell phones.
The location data retrieved through the communication
between a cell phone and a cell site is stored “for various lengths of
time on third party servers.”55 This means that an individual, by
simply using his or her cell phone, allows location information to be
accessed by a third party, the cell phone service provider.56
Therefore, since third-party service providers automatically
retrieve cell phone data, individuals are deemed to have waived any
privacy expectations to that information.57 Consequently, those
individuals are denied any protections, as to that information,
under the Fourth Amendment.58
The Supreme Court first addressed the Third-Party Doctrine
and technology in Smith v. Maryland.59 The Court held that the
individual using the telephone did not have any expectation of
privacy in the numbers dialed.60 The Court further held that such
expectation of privacy would not be reasonable because that
individual knew that he or she would have to give the telephone
numbers to the telephone company in order to place a call. 61 Since
the individual provided the telephone company with the telephone
number information, that information was no longer private. 62
Smith and similar cases hinge on the concept of an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy.63 Since the individual is giving
information to a third party, or in the case of cell phones, allowing
information to be taken by a third party, there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy.64
The Third-Party Doctrine poses a serious problem for
individuals using cell phones. Whenever a cell phone automatically
pings or communicates with the cell tower, the individual has been
deemed to have waived any Fourth Amendment protections as to
the information stored in the cell tower.65 In order to better deal
54. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); Bedi, supra note 42, at 2.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Smith, 442 U.S. at 735; Bedi, supra note 42, at 2.
58. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
59. Bedi, supra note 42, at 2; Smith, 442 U.S. at 735.
60. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
61. Bedi, supra note 42, at 13; see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 742 (rejecting
claims that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in numbers dialed).
Smith has since been superseded by the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act, a federal statute. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hamm, 306 S. Ct. 70, 75 (1991).
62. Smith, 442 U.S. at 472.
63. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977) (holding the privacy
expectation in a footlocker is significantly greater than cars); see Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (asserting individual relied on privacy of phone
booth); see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978) (stating cars have different
expectation of privacy than houses).
64. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
65. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976); see generally Fox,
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with the rise and expansion of technology, in terms of its implication
on searches and seizures, Congress enacted the Stored
Communications Act (SCA).66 The Act concerns the disclosure of
electronic communication and stored records held by third-party
service providers.67
The Act gives individuals some statutory privacy rights to the
stored information inevitably held by third-party service
providers.68 For example, service providers cannot voluntarily give
information obtained from their customers to the government.69 The
government, however, can compel a service provider to disclose the
information under a few circumstances. 70 If the information is in
“electronic storage for 180 days or less, the government must obtain
a search warrant” in order to obtain the information held by the
service provider.71 In order to obtain a search warrant, the
government must prove that it has probable cause to perform the
search.72 If the information is in “electronic storage” for more than
180 days, the government can either issue a subpoena to the thirdparty service provider or request a court order to obtain the
information held by the service provider.73 By using a subpoena or
a court order, the government needs only to establish “specific and
articulable facts” showing a “reasonable ground to believe” that the
information sought is “relevant and material.” 74 In order to obtain
a court order or subpoena, a lesser burden is placed upon the
government to explain its need to obtain the information
requested.75 Therefore, it is significantly easier to acquire the
information by subpoena or court order than it would be if the
supra note 49, at 773-75 (explaining how cell phones communicate with cell
towers); U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
66. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2012).
67. Id.
68. Id. The court in United States v. Davis stated that the Stored
Communications Act provides individuals with more protection than would be
the case under the Third-Party Doctrine because it requires law enforcement
officers to go to court and have a Judge review the facts before a court order is
issued. 785 F.3d 498, 506 (11th Cir. 2015).
69. Orin S. Kerr, The Future of Internet Surveillance Law: A Symposium to
Discuss Internet Surveillance, Privacy & the USA Patriot Act: Surveillance,
Law: Reshaping the Framework: A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications
Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending it, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV 1208, 1212
(2004).
70. 18 U.S.C § 2703 (2012).
71. Kerr, supra note 69, at 1218-19; 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).
72. Shadwick v. Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972). Moreover, probable cause
deals with the totality of the circumstances of whether there is a fair possibility
that a crime was committed. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230. The idea of probable cause
cannot be reduced into numbers or percentages. Id. It is a fluid concept that is
dependent on the situation. Id.
73. Kerr, supra note 69, at 1218-19; 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).
74. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d. 332, 344 (4th Cir. 2015); Lode, supra
note 45, at 2.
75. Kerr, supra note 69, at 1218-19; 18 U.S.C. §2703 (2012).
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government was required to obtain a search warrant.76 This means
that an individual’s privacy expectation can be significantly
diminished when dealing with old cell phone location data. 77
The Supreme Court finally addressed the issue of searching a
cell phone incident to a lawful arrest in Riley v. California.78 The
Court held that a warrant is required to search a cell phone even if
it is seized incident to a lawful arrest because of the “significant
diminution of privacy” resulting from the search of the cell phone.79
Precedent established that searches are constitutional incident to a
lawful arrest.80 Society places great importance not only in the
safety of the arresting officer but also in the preservation of the
evidence to be used in a potential criminal proceeding. 81 However,
in Riley, the Supreme Court noted the inherent differences between
other items of personal property that are found on a person and a
cell phone.82 The Court placed great emphasis on the fact that a cell
phone contains a plethora of private information. 83 The Court stated
that once a cell phone is secured and is outwardly inspected for any
weapons, the cell phone itself, taken away from the arrestee, poses
no harm to the officer.84 Additionally, since the cell phone is no
longer in the possession of the arrestee, the arrestee can no longer

76. Id.; Kerr, supra note 69, at 1218-19; Graham, 796 F.3d at 344 (requiring
higher standard for obtaining warrant than obtaining court order).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).
78.. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2473 (2014). In this case, the
defendant was arrested on a weapons charge. Id. at 2480. Upon searching his
person, as allowed by United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), the
arresting officers found a cell phone on his person. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480.
Upon opening and viewing the contents of the cell phone, the officers found
reference to terms associated with a street gang. Id. Upon further examination
of the cell phone content, the officers were able to charge the defendant with a
shooting that had occurred weeks earlier. Id.
79. Id. at 2493. This is the case unless there is some “exigencies of the
situation [which] make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a
warrantless search is objectively reasonable.” Id. at 2494.
80. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
81. The Supreme Court noted that during an arrest, the officer can be in
danger because the officer has no way of knowing if the arrestee has any
dangerous objects on his person that can be used against the officer unless the
officer is able to search the arrestee. Id. Moreover, the Court noted that another
exigent circumstance is the preservation of evidence because it is a possible that
the individual on the premise may remove or destroy evidence. Id. at 773-74.
82. “Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and qualitative sense from
other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person.” Riley, 134 S. Ct. at
2489. For example, an arrestee may have a weapon or dangerous object on his
or her person which can cause significant harm to the officer if not obtained at
the time of the arrest. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63. The Court noted that a cell
phone is essentially a minicomputer. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489. The information
contained in the cell phone has no real ability to harm an officer, but can contain
significant private information about the individual. Id. at 2489-91.
83. Id. at 2489.
84. Id. at 2486.
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delete or alter the information contained on the phone, thus the
evidence contained in the cell phone will be preserved. 85
In the case of United States v. Graham, the Defendants were
arrested for several robberies. 86 During the post-arrest
investigation, the police officers investigating the matter recognized
some similarities between these robberies and other earlier
robberies in the area.87 Pursuant to the SCA, the government
obtained two court orders for the disclosure of the Defendants’ cell
site location information.88 The court orders requested information
regarding text messages and phone calls that the two Defendants
sent and received from each other.89 In accordance with the SCA,
the government was able to obtain court orders for this information
as opposed to a search warrant because the location information
that the officers requested was in storage for more than 180 days. 90
The Fourth Circuit stated that individuals have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their location information. 91 Moreover, the
Court stated that the Third-Party Doctrine was inapplicable since
cell phone users do not “voluntarily convey their [cell site location
information] to their service providers.” 92 Thus, the government
conducted a search of the Defendants’ cell phone information,
without a search warrant, which constituted a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.93 The cell cite location information, however,
was admissible since the police officers relied in good faith on the
Stored Communications Act.94
The Fourth Amendment generally involves physical
intrusions, but as technology advances, the parameters of the
Fourth Amendment should also expand to encompass electronic
intrusions.95 Currently, there is a circuit court split regarding the
85. Id. Even if the cell phone is in the possession of a law enforcement
official, the government may be concerned about remote date wiping. Id.
“Remote wiping occurs when a phone, connected to a wireless network, receives
a signal [from a third party] that erases the date.” Id. at 2486. Remote data
wiping can also occur if a cell phone enters into or “leaves certain geographic
areas.” Id. However, remote data wiping can be easily prevented by
“disconnecting a phone from the network” by either turning off the phone or by
taking out the battery. Id. at 2487.
86. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d. 332, 340 (4th Cir. 2015)
87. Id.
88. Id. at 341.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 343.
91. Id. at 345.
92. Id. at 356.
93. Id. at 344-45.
94. Id. at 338.
95. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 4273, 2493 (2014); see also Patrick T.
Chamberlain, Court Ordered Disclosure of Historical Cell Site Location
Information: The Argument for the Probable Cause Standard, 66 WASH & LEE
L. REV. 1745, 1783-84 (2009) (stating proposition that Congress having “taken
pains to protect electronically-derived location information from unwarranted
disclosure serves independently to make subjectively-held expectations of
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issue of the expectation of privacy in obtaining cell site location
information without a warrant. 96 Some courts, such as the Third,
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have deemed such a search reasonable
while others courts, such as the Fourth Circuit, have not.97 These
inconsistencies may be a result of the dissimilar rulings by the
Supreme Court regarding privacy expectations as the Supreme
Court tackles changing technological advancements. 98 Thus, a need
for uniformity is necessary so that an individual’s rights are not
infringed upon depending on which state he or she resides.99
For a Fourth Amendment violation, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that an individual must claim a reasonable
expectation of privacy that has been impinged upon by the
government.100 Therefore, this comment addresses whether an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her cell
site location information. Additionally, this comment looks at
whether an individual waives his or her expectation of privacy when
a third-party service provider acquires information from the
individual’s cell phone.

III. ANALYSIS
As society advances technologically, the expectation of privacy
within the parameters of the Fourth Amendment should also
expand to encompass electronic intrusions. This section analyzes
whether it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for police officers
to conduct a search of cell phone location data without a warrant. 101
Specifically, this section examines the Fourth Circuit appellate case
of United States v. Graham and discusses whether there was a
Fourth Amendment violation when a police officer conducted a
search of the Defendants’ cell phone location data without a search
privacy objectively reasonable.”).
96. Id. at 1784-86.
97. In re United States for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Commun.
Serv. To Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F. 3d 304, 313 (3rd Cir. 2010)
(holding cell site location information “is obtainable under a § 2703(d) order and
that such an order does not require the traditional probable cause
determination.”); In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site
Data, 724 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding court order requiring disclosure
of historical cell site information is constitutional); United States v. Davis, 785
F.3d 498, 506 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding production of cell site location
information did not violate Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights); Graham,
796 F.3d. at 332 (holding that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in
cell phone location data); see generally Raymond Boyce, The Stored
Communications Act: Proper Law Enforcement Tool or Instrument of
Oppression?, 118 W. VA. L. REV 919 (2015) (commenting on the circuit court split
in decisions regarding cell site location information).
98. Boyce, supra note 97, at 930.
99. Chamberlain, supra note 95, at 1789.
100. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)
101. Id.

568

The John Marshall Law Review

[50:555

warrant.102 This section uses Graham to analyze and balance the
interests between an individual’s privacy rights and a government’s
legitimate state interest.103
To determine whether a violation of the Fourth Amendment
occurred, this section first examines whether or not the monitoring
of cell phone data constitutes a search. Second, it discusses the
reasonable expectation of privacy. Third, it investigates whether a
police officer seeking to examine the cell phone location date stored
in a cell tower should invoke the Third-Party Doctrine. Fourth, it
considers the implication of the Stored Communications Act. Fifth,
it analyzes whether the balance of interest tips in favor of the
legitimate government interests or the defendant’s reasonable
expectation of privacy in his or her cell phone location data. 104
In Graham, the Defendants were charged with multiple
felonies arising out of multiple robberies.105 During the Defendant’s
“post-arrest investigation,” the police officers executed search
warrants for the Defendants’ homes and pick-up truck and, among
other things, found two cell phones in the pick-up truck.106 The
State, pursuant to the SCA, obtained two court orders for the
disclosure of the cell site location information from Spring/Nextel
“for all calls and text messages transmitted to and from both
phones” for a 221 day time period.107 The State was able to obtain
this information without a search warrant because the information
was in storage for more than 180 days. 108 The State used the
information acquired from the cell sites to establish the locations of
the Defendants at times before and after other similar robberies in
the area.109 The Defendants filed a motion to suppress the cell site
location information obtained from Spring/Nextel asserting that the
disclosure of the information constituted an unreasonable search
since it was done without a warrant based on probable cause. 110
Thus, the Defendants asserted that the search violated their Fourth
Amendment rights.111 The Fourth Circuit held that obtaining the
cell phone location information constituted an unreasonable
search.112 However, since the police officers acted with good faith

102. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 340 (4th Cir. 2015); U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
103. Graham, 796 F.3d. at 332.
104. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); Kathryn R. Urbonya, Rhetorically
Reasonable Police Practices: Viewing the Supreme Court’s Multiple Discourse
Paths, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1387, 1394-95 (2003).
105. Graham, 796 F.3d. at 338.
106. Id. at 340.
107. Id. at 341-42.
108. Id. at 343.
109. Id. at 342.
110. Id. at 341-42.
111. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
112. Graham, 796 F.3d at 343.
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reliance on the SCA, the information was not suppressed. 113 Upon
receiving this holding, the government “moved for a rehearing en
banc.”114 Upon rehearing, the Fourth Circuit held “that the
government’s acquisition of historical CSLI from Defendants’ cell
phone provider did not violate the Fourth Amendment” because an
individual does not enjoy Fourth Amendment protection to
information turned over to a third party.115

A.

Applicability of the Fourth Amendment

For the Fourth Amendment to be applicable, the government
action must constitute either a search or a seizure.116 A search
occurs when the government impinges on an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy or when the government
trespasses upon an individual’s private property with the intent to
gain information.117 A seizure occurs when there is a meaningful
interference with an individual’s possessory interest in the property
or when a “reasonable person would have believed that he was not
free to leave.”118 The acquisition of cell site location information is
not a seizure since it does not involve either the interference of
possessory interest nor does it involve an individual. 119 Thus, this
comment will solely focus on whether the government’s action
constituted a search. If the government action of obtaining the cell
site location information constitutes a search, then a defendant

113. Id. Good faith is a warrant exception. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 924 (1984). Good faith is an important concept in that the Supreme Court
does not mandate that a police officer be absolutely correct in executing his or
her actions in every circumstance. Id. Rather, good faith only mandates that an
officer acts objectively reasonably with the information that is available to that
officer. Id.
114. Graham, 824 F.3d at 424.
115. Id. at 424-25. This comment relies on the original decision by the
Fourth Circuit in 2015. Id. at 345.
116. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. If the government action does not involve either
a search or a seizure, then the Fourth Amendment does not apply, and the
action can be performed as long as it does not violate any other portion of the
United States Constitution. Id.; see Twenty-Fifth Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure: I. Investigation and Police Practices, 84 GEO. L.J. 717, 718-19 (1996)
(stating “Fourth Amendment applies only to searches and seizures that are the
product of government action.”); see Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475
(1921) (applying Fourth Amendment protections when actions done by
government actors).
117. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 360 (1967).
118. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
119. This government action is not a seizure because an individual is still
able to use his or her cell phone without any disturbance from the government.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113; Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
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must show that it interferes with an individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.120

B.

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

“The ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness.”121 In order to decide whether or not the search
conducted by a police officer is constitutional, the question really
being asked is whether the search was reasonable. 122 The default
position taken by the Supreme Court is that a search is reasonable
if it is conducted pursuant to a warrant. 123 However, there are
exceptions in which a search can be reasonable without a
warrant.124
120. This comment contends that the government action constitutes a
search because an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy that his
or her every movement will not be observed by a government actor. Katz, 389
U.S. at 361. Moreover, this comment will focus exclusively on searches
conducted by public officials and will not address any outcomes relating to a
seizure.
121. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
122. Id.; Katz, 389 U.S at 361.
123. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995). If a police
officer is required to have a warrant in order to search or seize an item, this
limits a police officer’s discretionary authority and requires the police officer to
have “particularized suspicion” as to that individual or piece of property.
Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the
Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483, 485 (1994);
United States v. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925). Thus, eliminating the fear
of “arbitrary and general searches and seizures” which have been deemed
“intolerable and unreasonable.” Clancy, at 485. Moreover, a search pursuant to
a warrant is deemed reasonable because a Judge decided whether there was
probable cause to issue a warrant and a police officer can rely on a judge’s
decision. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 958 (1984).
124. There are a number of exceptions in which the Court allows police
officers to conduct searches and seizures without a warrant. See generally
Fourteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court
and Courts of Appeals 1983-84: I. Investigation and Police Practices (Part 1 of
2), 73 GEO. L.J. 253, 316 (1984) (explaining when exigent circumstances may
lead to a warrantless search or seizure). One such warrant exception is for
emergency situations. Preston v. United States. 364 U.S. 364, 367 (1964). For
example, one type of emergency situation is if there is a fear of the imminent
destruction of evidence. Id. The Supreme Court in Preston found that a
warrantless search is justified by the need to “prevent the destruction of
evidence of the crime.” Id. Another type of exigent situation is when there is a
risk of danger to the police or to the general public. Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). In the case of Chimel, the Court found it reasonable to
conduct a full search of an individual pursuant to his or her lawful custodial
arrest. Id. This is because the Court wants to ensure the safety of the officer
when dealing with a potentially armed suspect. Id. In the case of Brigham City,
the Court found it reasonable for a police officer to enter the dwelling in order
to prevent physical harm to the individual who was spitting blood inside.
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006). The acceptable reasons to have a
warrantless search and seizure have been expanding to allow for more exigent
circumstances. Clancy, supra note 122, at 486.
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Justice John Marshall Harlan noted in his concurring opinion
in Katz v. United States that individuals have an expectation of
privacy from intrusions into a place that is private.125 An intrusion
into this private sphere is unreasonable. 126 On a separate occasion,
the Supreme Court also stated that “individuals have privacy rights
in [their] movements, in [their] location, and in the location of
[their] personal property in private spaces, particularly when such
information is available only through technological means not in
use by the general public.”127
In order to analyze whether the search of cell phone location
data information is reasonable, the Supreme Court would look at
the uniqueness of the information gained from the search, the
timeframe of the search in relation to the expectation of privacy and
the location of the individual during the time period of the search. 128
1.

Uniqueness of the Information Gained

The type of information acquired by government action is
essential in determining whether or not a search actually occurred
and whether or not it is reasonable. 129 The more unique and
intrusive the information acquired, the more this conduct resembles
a search.130 When the government accesses cell site location
information, regarding a particular cell phone, the government is
able to acquire information regarding the location of the cell phone
and its user at different points in time.131 Moreover, the government

125. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). It is Justice Harlan’s
opinion that the Fourth Amendment protects people and their expectation of
privacy. Id.
126. Id.
127. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d. 332, 345 (2015) (citing a proposition
held by the Supreme Court).
128. Id.
129. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-09 (2005). The Supreme Court
held that given the binary character of the use of a drug sniffing dog, the action
cannot be considered a search because the only thing that the government has
learned from the action is whether or not the substance in the car was illegal
drugs. Id. The government is not able to obtain any other information regarding
non-contraband items from the dog’s indication. Id. at 409. The Court further
noted that the individual has no expectation of privacy in the possession of
contraband and emphasized the importance of the fact that the dog sniff was
performed while the individual was subject to a lawful traffic stop. Id. at 40809.
130. In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site
Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 117 (E.D.N.Y 2011). This District Court noted that
“read together, Karo and Knotts stand for the proposition that the Government’s
obtaining of some electronically collected location information constitutes a
search under the Fourth Amendment depending on the location […] and quality
of that information.” Id.
131. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d. 332, 350 (2015).
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is able to ascertain how long that individual stayed at that
location.132
In Graham, the records revealed 29,659 location points for one
Defendant and 28,410 location points for the other Defendant. 133
This means that the government was able to ascertain over
approximately 100 location points for each Defendant for each
day.134 This information can give the government a detailed picture
of the movements of each Defendant.135 In Graham, the police
officers sought to obtain this information to ascertain whether or
not the Defendants were in the vicinity of other similar robberies
that took place in the area.136 Therefore, the government sought this
information to learn more than just simple non-intrusive facts.137
Rather, the government sought this information to learn intimate
and intrusive details of the whereabouts of the cell phone user and
potentially charge the Defendants with other crimes. 138

132. Id.
133. Id. Every time that an individual moves from place to place, the cell
phone communicates with the nearest cell tower in order to establish a viable
signal. Freiwald, supra note 19, at 702-03. While the frequency of this
connection depends on the individual service provider and the situation, “it
appears that [the connection is made] as frequently as every seven seconds.” Id.
While the provider does not keep every single piece of data, the service provider
does keep data from when the individual uses his or her cell phone to write a
text message, place a phone call or browse the internet. Id. Moreover, the
provider “could report location information every fifteen minutes.” Id. at 708.
134. Graham, 796 F.3d at 350.
135. Id. The information gained is more than just simply indicating whether
or not an illegal item or situation exists, this information gives specific details
regarding an individual’s location. Id. at 378; see contra Illinois v. Caballes, 543
U.S. 405, 408-09 (2005) (holding that desire for privacy is not equivalent to
expectation of privacy). The Court further explained the “expectation that
certain facts will not come to the attention of the authorities is not the same as
an interest in privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable.” (citing
United States. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984)). The government is able to
ascertain a significant amount of information regarding a person from that
person’s cell phone. Graham, 796 F.3d at 378. While this comment does not
address the Fourth Amendment protection of accessing information from the
actual cell phone, it should be noted that cell phones store a plethora of
information regarding a person. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 4273, 2473 (2014)
A cell phone can store thousands of pictures labeled with dates, a calendar,
financial information, social networking pages, emails and the like. Id. There is
great potential of the government, when accessing a cell phone, to gain intimate
private details of an individual. Id.
136. Graham, 796 F.3d. at 351. The FCC Commercial Mobile Services, 47
C.F.R. § 20.18(h)(1) (2012) requires that by 2012, cell phone carriers must have
the ability to locate a phone within “300 meters for 95% of calls.” Id.
137. United States v. Jones, 656 U.S. 400, 415 (2012).
138. Graham, 796 F.3d at 351; Jones, 656 U.S. at 414. A police officer can
learn more about an individual from his or her cell phone data than what can
be observed from following an individual down a public street. Riley, 134 S. Ct.
at 2473; United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). Justice Sotomayor
in her concurrence in Jones noted that the nature of GPS monitoring violations
the Fourth Amendment because the quality of the information obtained
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Some courts allege that the cell site location information
should be treated like a business record since the cell service
provider is keeping these types of records during the course of their
normal business operations.139 Yet, the information revealed from
these location records provides the government with much more
detail about an individual than can be obtained from some other
third-party records kept during the course of normal business
operations.140 Therefore, this type of information is more unique
then other types of business records.141
2.

Timeframe of a Search

The amount of time allowed for a search is equally important
when analyzing whether or not the government action meets
society’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 142 The Supreme Court
previously stated in United States v. Knotts that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in short-term monitoring of an
individual conducted on public streets. 143 The Court reasoned that
anyone on that public street can see the individual traveling in a
particular direction or stopping at a particular destination. 144
Therefore, a search, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
does not occur.145 However, the use of long term monitoring pushes
the boundary of what is consistent with society’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.146 In United States v. Jones, the Supreme
impinges on an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Jones, 656 U.S.
at 414. She notes that “GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive
record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual orientation.” Id. at 407.
The government in assessing this information can ascertain when an individual
goes to the doctor, sees an attorney, goes to a bar, goes home, enters a church
and so much more. Id. This is the same type of information that can be gained
from cell phone location information. Graham, 796 F.3d at 350.
139. In Re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600,
611-12 (5th Cir. 2013). The cell phone service provider is independently storing
this location information in order to better optimize its service. United States
v. Madison, No. 11-60285, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105527, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July
30, 2012). For example, a cell phone company may use the information acquired
in order to appropriately bill its customers. Id. If an individual’s plan requires
an additional charge for roaming, then the cell phone company will use location
information in order to bill accordingly. Id.
140. Lauren E. Babst, No More Shortcuts: Protect Cell Site Location Data
With a Warrant Requirement, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV 363, 393
(2015). The Court stated that the location of a person within his or her residence
is an intimate detail about the residence; see also United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (holding warrantless searches and seizures inside a home
are “presumptively unreasonable absent exigent circumstances.”).
141. Babst, supra note 140.
142. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
146. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429 (2012).
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Court held the “installation of the GPS device” and the use of “the
GPS devise to monitor the vehicle’s movement” constituted a
search.147 In that case, the Defendant was under suspicion of
trafficking narcotics.148 The State obtained a search warrant which
authorized the police officers to install a GPS device on the
Defendant’s vehicle and monitored the vehicle for twenty-eight
days.149 However, the State did not install the GPS device in
compliance with the warrant.150 Thus, the warrant was invalid.151
The Supreme Court held that the installation of the GPS device
constituted a search; and it was impermissible for the government
to “physically occupy private property for the purpose of obtaining
information.”152
Justice Samuel Alito in his concurring opinion in Jones further
suggested that society expects law enforcement officials to refrain
from “secretly monitor[ing] and catalogue[ing] every single
movement of an individual’s car for a very long period” of time. 153 In
a case like Graham, the amount of information that can be acquired
during a long term surveillance is astonishing since a cell tower
frequently acquires new location information from a cell phone. 154
Using the location information, law enforcement officials can fairly
accurately track the individual throughout the day. 155 The
monitoring of cell phone data is similar to the GPS monitoring in
Jones because the law enforcement agent acquires a plethora of
location information in a given time period.156 In essence, the law
enforcement agents are able to monitor every single movement of
the individual.157 This long term electronic monitoring greatly
impinges on individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 158 This
is because an individual’s every movement can be assessed and

147. Id. at 403. The Court reasoned that “the government physically
occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.” Id. at 404.
Thus, that “physical intrusion would have been considered a search.” Id. at 40405. The Court does not address whether there was a reasonable expectation of
privacy since it found the action to constitute a search. Id. at 406.
148. Id. at 400.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 402-03. The warrant authorized the “installation of the device in
the District of Columbia and for the installation to be made within 10 days.” Id.
The GPS was installed on the 11th day and in Maryland. Id. at 403.
151. Id.
152. Id. Justice Sotomayor, in her concurring opinion, addressed that “a
Fourth Amendment search [also] occurs when the government violates a
subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.” Id. at
414.
153. Id.
154. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d. 332, 350 (2015).
155. Id.
156. Id.; Jones, 565 U.S. at 469.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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scrutinized more thoroughly than what could be assessed by
watching an individual as he or she travels down a public street. 159
While neither Justice Alito nor the Court in Jones indicated
the amount of time required to pass before a police officer’s
warrantless monitoring of an individual moves from a reasonable
observation to an unreasonable search, Justice Alito argued that in
Jones it occurred before four weeks of monitoring.160 In Graham, the
search consisted of 55 weeks, or 221 days, of surveillance, well
beyond the approximate four-week threshold.161
3.

Location of the Individual While a Search is Conducted

The Supreme Court also bases its reasonableness analysis on
the location of the individual being subjected to a search. 162 The
government usually argues that it is not requiring the cell phone
service provider to create or keep this location information. 163 Thus,
the government should have access to information already
independently created by cell service providers. 164 However, the
problem is the inherently intrusive nature of cell site location
information.165 If allowed to access this information, the
government can gain knowledge about an individual’s private and
public movements, including information about individuals while
they are inside of their homes.166 Details about information
occurring in the home, including the location of an individual, is

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Graham, 796 F.3d. at 347. This search is certainly an infringement of
an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Jones, 565 U.S. at 429.
However, given the wealth of information acquired from the near constant
location information gained from cell towers, a search may begin significantly
before four weeks of monitoring. Graham, 796 F.3d. at 341. Maybe even just
after a day or two. Id. at 340. The district court in Maryland in quoting Senator
Wyden stated, “tracking an individual’s movements on a twenty-four-hour basis
for an extended period of time […] is qualitatively different than visually
observing the person during a single trip.” In re U.S. ex rel. an Order
Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. Of a Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F.
Supp. 2d 526, 556 (Md. 2011).
162. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983). The Court held
that since the car is traveling on a public street there is no expectation of
privacy. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001). Conversely, the Supreme
Court held that all details within a home are intimate details to be “held safe
from prying government eyes.” United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984).
The Supreme Court held that the monitoring of a beeper within a private
residence violates the reasonable expectation of privacy of a residence. Id.
163. In Re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600,
611-12 (5th Cir. 2013).
164. Id.
165. Graham, 796 F.3d. at 378.
166. Id. The cell towers are constantly gathering information regarding the
user’s location not only “around town, but also within a particular building
including the privacy of his or her own home.” Id.
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subject to more stringent privacy standards than would be the case
in other more public locations.167 This is because the Supreme Court
has read into the Fourth Amendment “special protection[s]” for an
individual within his or her own home.168
Some courts also allege that the monitoring of the individual
within the house is not directly recorded or collected by the
government.169 Therefore, these courts argue, the monitoring does
not impinge on a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy, since
the Fourth Amendment only gives individual’s protection against
government actions.170 For example, the Court in United States v.
Jacobsen held that the expectation of privacy had already been
extinguished when a private individual initially opened and looked
into a package.171 Therefore, the government was not prohibited by
the Fourth Amendment from also looking into the package. 172
However, the ruling in Jacobsen rests on the proposition that the

167. Just like in Kyllo, details, such as how warm a house is, are intimate
details of the home. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37-38. The police officer should not be
given free reign into any and all details of a home regardless of how
presumptively non-intimate an item within the house appears to be. Id.; see
Silverman v. United States., 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (stating that man has
right to retreat into home without “unreasonable governmental intrusion.”).
168. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 (1984). An individual expects the
most privacy when she is within her own home. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705, 714 (1984).
169. United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511 (2015); United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976); Smith v. Md., 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979); see
generally U.S. v. Caraballo, 963 F. Supp. 2d 341, 362 (D. Vt. 2013) (discussing
Sprint/Nextel’s policy of collecting “information regarding the location of its
customer’s cell phones while in use.”).
170. The Court in Walter v. United States held that an action by a private
individual, “not acting as an agent of the government or with the participation
or knowledge of any governmental official” does not violate the Fourth
Amendment even if the private individual conducts an unreasonable search or
seizure. 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980). Moreover, the court in In Re Application of
the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data cites and distinguishes Smith from Karo.
724 F.3d 600, 611-12 (5th Cir. 2013). This court says that while both Smith and
Karo involve the “government’s acquisition of information about the interior of
a home: that a particular canister was located in the home or that a person was
calling particular numbers for a phone in the home. But in Karo […], the
Government was the one collecting and recording that information.” Id. In
Smith, the phone service provider was obtaining the records and the
government just sought the information from the phone service provider. Id.
171. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117-120 (1984). In this case, a
FedEx employee opened a damaged package in order to examine its contents
pursuant to “company policy” and found a white substance believed to be
cocaine. Id. at 111. Upon finding this substance, the company called a federal
agent who took and tested the white substance and determined it was cocaine.
Id. Since the government agent does not learn anything that was not already
learned before by the private individual, there is no “legitimate expectation of
privacy.” Id. at 120. Moreover, this does not constitute a search under the
Fourth Amendment since the testing of the substance was a binary procedure.
Id.
172. Id. at 117-120.
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Government did not learn anything more than what was previously
learned by the private individual’s search of the package. 173 In a
situation where the government is monitoring historical cell site
location information, the government learns more than what was
previously known by the private individual. 174 The cell service
providers use the location information to provide better service to
its customers.175 The service providers are probably not using the
information to monitor and actually track the movements of its
customers from place to place in order to determine the exact
whereabouts of its customers at certain points in time. 176 However,
by searching the cell site location information, law enforcement
officials learn unique and private facts about an individual’s
movements that do not advance the business interests of the cell
service provider.177 Thus, this type of monitoring furthers only the
government’s interests.178
This type of surveillance impinges on the reasonable
expectation of privacy because of the prolonged and unique nature
of the information obtained through historical cell site
information.179 This type of search also impinges on an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy because individuals will likely
enter their residences during the timeframe of the prolonged
search.180

C.

Third-Party Doctrine

The Supreme Court is firm in its conclusion that when there is
a reasonable expectation of privacy, the government cannot impinge
upon this privacy right unless it has probable cause to do so. 181
However, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to expand what
reasonableness means in a changing technological environment. 182
173. Id. at 120.
174. United States v. Place, 462, U.S. 696, 707 (1983). The Court held that
the type of information gained from the dog sniff is pivotal in the determination
of whether it is reasonable. Id. Since the government was not acquiring any
private facts about legal items held in the luggage, it did not impinge on any
reasonable expectation of privacy. Id.
175. In Re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at
611-12.
176. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d. 332, 343 (2015).
177. Susan Freiwald, Law Enforcement Access to Third Party Records: Light
in the Darkness: How the Leatpr Standards Guide Legislators in Regulating
Law Enforcement Access to Cell Site Location Records, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 875,
903 (2014).
178. Id.
179. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014); Graham, 796 F.3d at
349.
180. Id.
181. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
182. Smith v. Md., 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979). This ruling came out in 1979,
and even so, 36 years later the Court has not significantly amended its thoughts
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While there are currently a few Justices that suggest changing the
meaning of reasonableness, the majority of the Court still
maintains that there is no expectation of privacy “that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable” when an individual
“voluntarily turns over [information] to third parties.” 183 The ThirdParty Doctrine states that the Fourth Amendment “does not protect
a person’s privacy in information she has volunteered to a third
party.”184
The Fifth Circuit has noted that, in the context of cell phone
use and conveyance of information to the third-party cell phone
company, the user knows and understands that his or her cell phone
sends a signal to a nearby cell tower in order to connect his or her
phone call.185 While individuals may know and understand that
they are turning over their electronic records to a third party, they
are not voluntarily turning over these records. 186 In order to use a
cell phone, the third-party service provider automatically retrieves
the cell phone user’s information without any sort of active or
passive participation from the user. 187 Some courts argue that there
regarding expectations of privacy when information is given to a third party
despite societies’ technological advancements in those 36 years. See generally
Evan Peters, The Technology We Exalt Today is Everyman’s Master, 44 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 103, 119-20 (2014) (illustrating flaw with technology and the
Third-Party Doctrine).
183. Thomas P. Crocker, Symposium on Cybercrime: Order, Technology, and
the Constitutional Meanings of Criminal Procedure, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 685, n. 4 (2013) (“Fourth Amendment doctrine, moreover, is
circular, for someone can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an area if
and only if the Court has held that a search in that area would be
unreasonable.” (quoting Michael Abramowicz, Constitutional Circularity, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1, 60-61 (2001)).
However, it seems as though the Court may soon change its mind regarding
information provided to third-party servers. For example, Justice Sotomayor in
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) stated that “it may be necessary
to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is
ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information
about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”
Id.
184. Elspeth A. Brotherton, Comment: Big Brother Gets a Makeover:
Behavioral Targeting and the Third-Party Doctrine, 61 EMORY L.J. 555, 559
(2012).
185. In Re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600,
613 (5th Cir. 2013). The Fifth Circuit Court also suggests that even if the
individual does not realize or know that their cell phone must connect to the
cell tower in order to place a phone call, the individual is deemed to know this
fact. Id. This is because in the individual’s cell phone contract it states that the
“provider uses a subscriber’s location information to route his cell phone calls”
and collects it. Id. Yet, the average reasonable person may not actually realize
that the cell phone company can take and store this information so that it can
be used by other entities, such as the government. United States v. Graham,
796 F.3d. 332, 354 (5th Cir. 2015).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 354-55. It can be argued that an individual actively participates
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is no need for active participation for an action to be voluntary. 188
Since the government “does not require a member of the public to
own or carry a cell phone,” this makes the use of a cell phone
completely voluntary.189 By extension, this makes the conveyance of
information voluntary.190
However, the use of a cell phone has become “essential to full
cultural and economic participation.”191 The simple act of using a
cell phone or carrying a cell phone cannot automatically mean that
the cell phone user has voluntarily conveyed his or her location
information to the cell phone provider, and thus extinguished all
expectation of privacy.192 While the government is not actually
requiring an individual to purchase and use a cell phone, in order
to function efficiently and effectively in society, an individual must
have and use a cell phone.193 Thus, a person “cannot be deemed to
have volunteered to forfeit expectations of privacy” by simply
participating in society.194
The Defendants in Graham did not voluntarily terminate their
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information retrieved by
the cell phone provider just because the Defendants used cell
phones in their day to day lives.195 Additionally, a government agent
should not have been able to request the Defendants’ cell phone
location information without a warrant and probable cause just
because the Defendants were required to allow the third-party cell
phone service provider to retrieve information regarding their
location.196

when that individual makes a phone call or sends a text message. Id. at 355.
However, the cell phone provider also retrieves information when the cell phone
user receives a phone call or test message. Id. The cell phone user has absolutely
no control over the receipt of such calls or messages, yet the information is still
conveyed to the cell phone provider. Id. Even so, this may be a flawed argument
since the use of cell phones have become an integral part of everyday society in
which individuals need the use of cell phones in order to complete all sorts of
tasks during the course of the day. Id.
188. In Re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at
613.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Graham, 796 F.3d. at 355-56. In Riley the Court stated that “[c]ell
phone and text message communications are so pervasive that some persons
may consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments for selfexpression, even self-identification.” Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490
(2014).
192. Graham, 796 F.3d. at 355-56.
193. Id.; Riley, 134 U.S. at 2484.
194. Graham, 796 F.3d. at 356.
195. Id. at 340.
196. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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D. Stored Communications Act
In 1986, Congress enacted the Stored Communications Act in
order to address the changes and advancements in technology. 197
Prior to the enactment of this law, the government simply issued
subpoenas to third-party service providers in order to require those
entities to produce “a wide variety of business records” and other
information.198 With the passage of this law, the government is
forced to take the additional step of obtaining judicial approval and
obtaining a court order prior to any information being tendered to
the government.199 A court order is issued if the court finds “specific
and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that … the records or other information sought […] are
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”200 This
standard, however, is drastically lower than a probable cause
standard needed before any other warrant can be issued. 201
Some courts have stated that individuals are afforded less
rights when their information is tendered to a third party. 202
Therefore, these courts argue that the SCA actually gives
individuals more protection by imposing a judicial review
requirement prior to the issuance of the court order. 203 However,
many other courts are unimpressed with this line of reasoning.204
This is because the Fourth Amendment imposes a probable cause
requirement upon searches.205 The reasonable expectation of
privacy is too great for certain types of electronic mediums to be
bypassed by a lower standard of evidence requirement. 206 These
197. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2012); United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266,
335 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating purpose of Store Communications Act is to
“maintain boundaries between citizen’s reasonable expectation of privacy and
crime prevention in light of quickly advancing technology.”).
198. United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 505 (11th Cir. 2015). This court
further noted that Congress required more than just a subpoena before the
government can obtain telephone records from a third party. Id. at 506.
199. Id. at 505.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
203. Id.; Davis, 785 F.3d at 505.
204. The court in Warshak stated that the Stored Communications Act is
unconstitutional since it allows the government to obtain emails without a
search warrant. Warshak, 490 F.3d at 288.
205. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In a limited number of circumstances, the
Supreme Court has allowed the state to perform searches and seizure with less
than probable cause. For example, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the
Supreme Court held that where a police officer “has reason to believe that he is
dealing with and armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has
probable cause to arrest,” he can seize the individual and search for weapons.
Id. at 27.
206. The court in Warshak stated that stated that individuals have a
reasonable expectation that their emails, which are stored with a commercial
ISP are kept private. 490 F.3d at 473. Just like an email is a mode of private
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courts would insist the Fourth Amendment requires that a law
enforcement officer obtain a warrant prior to searching information
provided to third parties from electronic mediums, 207 thereby
protecting an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.208

E.

Balancing Test between Legitimate Government
Interest and an Individual’s Expectation of Privacy

In order to determine the constitutionality of a government
action, society must balance opposing interests in order to
determine whether or not the action meets with society’s privacy
expectations.209 The two interests that must be balanced are the
degree to which the government action is necessary to promote its
own legitimate interest and the degree to which the government
action intrudes upon an individual’s reasonable expectation of
privacy.210
1.

Legitimate Government Interest

There are two primary government interests at play regarding
searches of cell site location information. 211 The first is safety of the
officer and the second is crime prevention.212 Law enforcement
officers may argue that in order to ensure their safety while on the
job, it is essential that they secure a cell phone in order to ensure

communication, cell phones, like landline telephones before them, are equally
private modes of communication. Id. The information that can be obtained from
the search of the cell phone location data should also be protected in the same
way as the communication itself. Id. The decision in Warshak, 490 F.3d 455 was
later vacated by Warshak, 532 F.3d 266. However, in Warshak, 631 F.3d 266,
the court found that since the government relied in good faith on the Stored
Communication Act, the evidence obtained from the search was allowed. The
court, however, still maintained that individuals have a “reasonable expectation
of privacy in the contents of emails.” Id. at 288.
207. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288. The Appellate Court in Graham noted “if a
new technology permits the government to access information that it previously
could not access without a warrant, using techniques not regulated under
preexisting rules that predate that technology, the effect will be that the Fourth
Amendment matters less and less over time.” United States v. Graham, 796
F.3d 332, 360 (2015).
208. Id.
209. Wyo. v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999).
210. Id.
211. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 778 (6th Cir. 2012); see also
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983) (stating devices such as
beepers facilitate police efficiency.”).
212. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2486 (2014). Additionally, the
Supreme Court has conceded that the government has an interest in preventing
the destruction of information so that a police officer can also secure the cell
phone in order to prevent the individual from deleting or altering any
incriminating information on the cell phone. Id.
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that there are no weapons on the cell phone.213 This government
interest is well accepted and is not at issue.214
Law enforcement officers may also argue that in order to
ensure that officers are able to do their job of solving crimes in the
most efficient and effective manner, officers should be allowed to
use electronic aids that merely enhance sensory facilities.215 Some
courts suggest that in order to keep up with technological
advancements, a police officer must also use technology to “prevent
criminals from circumventing the justice system.” 216 Furthermore,
these courts suggests that the best way to gauge the interests that
the public seek to protect is by Congress enacting legislation, such
as the SCA, in order for officers to effectively balance between
competing interests.217
2.

An Individual’s Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Interest

As previously discussed, individuals have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their location. 218 A police officer can
acquire intimate details about an individual’s private life by
acquiring and tracking the individual’s precise whereabouts. 219 The
government infringes upon this Fourth Amendment protection if
the search is done without probable cause and a warrant. 220

213. The Supreme Court has accepted as true the proposition that a cell
phone can be secured in order to ensure that there are no weapons on the cell
phone, like a razor blade hidden in the cell phone case. Id. at 2486.
214. Id.
215. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282. The law enforcement official can argue that
since he can obtain the same type of information from the cell site information
that he could have obtained through visual surveillance, the officer should be
allowed to use the more efficient method in order to advance the government
interest of keeping fellow officers safe and solving crimes. Skinner, 690 F.3d at
778; see also United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 951 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding
DEA agents can call cell phone to “ping” suspect’s location information to find
suspect on public road).
216. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284. For example, there are features on modern cell
phones which allows cell phone to erase data or automatically lock in order to
prevent others from accessing information. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2486. However,
this particular threat of destruction of evidence can be eliminated by removing
the battery from the cell phone or taking the phone off the network. Id. at 248687.
217. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
Since Congress, as representatives of the people, believed that the Stored
Communications Acts provides the best protection for the people while still
allowing police to solve crimes, then these protections should be deemed
reasonable. Id.
218. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 351 (2015).
219. Jones, 565 U.S. at 414.
220. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Balancing of Interests

Some courts argue that the mere desire to keep cell site
location information private does not equate to a reasonable
expectation of privacy.221 These courts reason that the desire for
these circumstances to remain private does not alone mean that
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in these
circumstances.222 However, desire for privacy alone does not drive
the analysis of a reasonable expectation of privacy.223 In Graham,
law enforcement officials gained a plethora of private information
from cell site location information. 224 Thus, the conduct of the law
enforcement officers began to closely resemble an unlawful search
using an attached GPS device when completed without a warrant
and without probable cause. 225 What is more, these types of
searches begin to look more like general searches, conducted in
colonial times, because law enforcement officials can
indiscriminately search vast amounts of information over an
extensive period of time.226 The expectation of privacy in the
location of the individual along with the quality and quantity of
information gained makes the expectation of privacy reasonable.

221. In Re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600,
613 (2013). For example, some individuals may want the contents of their trash
bags to be kept private. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988).
Some individuals may want their property to be protected from law enforcement
officials flying overhead. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989). Just because
these individuals want these things to be private, does not mean that they are
private under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984).
222. Id. The Supreme Court stated that “the concept of an interest in privacy
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable is […] critically different
from the mere expectation, however well justified.” Id.
223. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). Not only must the
individual have “an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” but also, there
must be an expectation of privacy “that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.” Id.
224. Having access to cell site location information is just like having access
to GPS information. Jones, 565 U.S. at 400. The Court in Jones held that a GPS
device which monitors “vehicle’s movements constitutes a search under the
Fourth Amendment.” Id.
225. Id.
226. In Re U.S. ex rel. an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location
Information of a Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 551 (Md. 2011).
These types of searches begin to look more like general warrant searches
because the search “informs the government on an almost continuous basis
where the subject is, at places where the government lacked probable cause to
believe he was, and with the persons about whom the government may have no
knowledge.” Id. The intrusion upon the individual’s everyday life is enormous.
Id. The reason why the Fourth Amendment was implemented was to ensure
that this type of search was impermissible. Clancy, supra note 122. However, it
seems as though the Fourth Amendment has lost its strength and these types
of searches are again being allowed. United States v. Graham, 796 F. 3d. 332
(2015)
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These types of broad searches, without warrants, are precisely what
the Fourth Amendment sought to prevent against. 227 Without
abiding by the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment,
individuals would not enjoy any privacy expectations.
While the government has a legitimate interest that it seeks to
preserve, it seems as though the balance of interest tips in favor of
the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in matters
relating to cell phone location information.228

IV. PROPOSAL
In a time when nearly all individuals have a cell phone on their
person at all times, the ramifications of allowing law enforcement
officials to acquire cell site location information without a search
warrant are enormous.229 In order to prevent law enforcement
officers from weakening the protections afforded to individuals by
the Fourth Amendment, this section proposes a uniform system
that dictates how law enforcement officials are to treat cell site
location information.230 The retrieval of cell site location
information should always be treated as a search that must conform
to the safeguards of the Fourth Amendment. 231 Therefore,
adherence to the Fourth Amendment can be accomplished by
revising the SCA to exclude the court order requirement and
eliminating the Third-Party Doctrine from cell site location
information search situations.
Currently, pursuant to the SCA, if cell site location information
is stored by the cell service provider for less than 180 days, in
accordance with the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement officers
must obtain a search warrant in order to retrieve the location
information.232 If the cell site location information is stored by the
cell service provider for more than 180 days, then law enforcement
officers can obtain the information with just a court order. 233 As it
stands, the SCA allows different methods of obtaining the same cell
227. Clancy, supra note 123.
228. Id. at 343.
229. Law enforcement officers can, with only a court order, obtain
information about an individual’s whereabouts and track where that individual
was minute by minute at certain points in the past. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712
(2012); Graham, 796 F.3d. at 341.
230. If law enforcement officers are able to obtain old cell site location
information without a warrant, the law enforcement officer can still perform a
search, within the meaning intended by the Fourth Amendment, while
circumventing the protections afforded to individuals by the Fourth
Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. If law enforcement officers are able to do
this, this weakens the Fourth Amendment and leaves it meaningless in relation
to advancements in technology. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 360
(2010).
231. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
232. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2012).
233. Id.
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site location information.234 These different methods solely depend
on the length of time that the cell site location information is held
by the cell service provider.235
Additionally, the standard of proof for obtaining a court order
is significantly less than the standard of proof for obtaining a search
warrant.236 While both methods require that the law enforcement
officer go to court and plead the matter in front of a Judge, it is
significantly easier to obtain a court order and retrieve location
information from cell phone service providers than it is to obtain a
search warrant.237 Therefore, the government’s ability to easily
obtain information from the cell phone service provider in certain
situations is problematic.238
Acquiring cell site location information solely with the use of a
court order is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 239 In order to
acquire cell site location information, a law enforcement officer
should have to demonstrate to the court that there is probable cause
to perform the search and a search warrant must be issued by a
court.240 It is not enough for a judge to review the evidence to
ascertain whether or not it is relevant and material. 241 This
standard of proof is too low to protect an individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.242 The Fourth Amendment requires more
protection for an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 243
In order to protect all individuals’ privacy rights within a society,
law enforcement officers should be required to have enough
evidence to satisfy the probable cause standard of proof.244

234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. The standard of proof for obtaining a Court Order is “specific and
articulable facts” which show a “reasonable ground to believe” that the
information is “relevant and material.” United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d. 332
344 (2015). The standard of proof for obtaining a warrant is probable cause. Id.
It requires much more evidence to obtain a warrant than to obtain a court order
because it requires more evidence to prove that there is probable cause than
that the information is relevant and material. Id.
237. Allowing a court order in some situations and a warrant in other
situations leads to situations wherein law enforcement officers are left with
complete discretion as to the request in order to bypass the more stringent
burden of proof. Id. at 341. In the case of Graham, law enforcement officers only
requested data that was over 180 days old. Id. Therefore, the law enforcement
officers only needed to obtain a court order, which requires a lower standard of
proof. Id.
238. Id. at 341, 344.
239. Id. The Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable
cause.” Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 344.
242. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
243. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
244. Id.; Graham, 796 F.3d at 344.
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When examining the balance of interest between an
individual’s privacy interest and the government’s public safety
interest, the balance tips in favor of the individual for three
reasons.245 First, there is a reasonable expectation of privacy
regarding an individual’s location information obtained from cell
sites, regardless of how long that information was held in storage. 246
An individual’s expectation of privacy of an individual does not
magically diminish just because the information is held in storage
for more than 180 days. Second, there is no real reason why there
is a different standard of proof between information stored for more
or less than 180 days when the only difference in the information
obtained is the amount of time that location information sat in
storage.247 There is no difference in the type of information
acquired.248 It is unreasonable to allow law enforcement officers to
infringe upon an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy
without giving that individual the protections granted by a properly
executed warrant.249 Third, the government does have a legitimate
interest in protecting the public and ensuring that law enforcement
officers efficiently prevent crime. 250 However, this valued goal does
not become devalued just because law enforcement officers would
have to obtain more evidence to acquire a warrant in order to search
the cell site location information. 251 The goals of the government
and an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy are not

245. Id. at 351.
246. Location information, obtained from cell towers, provides law
enforcement officers with unique information about an individual. Graham, 796
F.3d. at 350. It allows law enforcement officers to know exactly where that
individual was at a certain point in time and how long that individual stayed
there. Id. This is especially troublesome because having this type of information
means that law enforcement officers are able to learn intimate details about a
person simply by knowing the location of the individual. Id. Law enforcement
officers are able to ascertain when an individual goes home, goes to the store,
goes to a religious center and so on. Id.
247. The content of “old” location information does not become less private
by simply being in storage for a longer period of time. Graham, 796 F.3d. at 350;
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). The information that can be
obtained from this information still violates an individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy because the information contained in the location data
still pertains to the individual’s private life. Graham, 796 F.3d at 350; Katz, 389
U.S. at 361. Law enforcement officers are able to ascertain where the individual
was at a certain time and for how long that individual was at that location,
including activities performed within the home. Graham, 796 F.3d at 350.
248. Id.
249. Wasserstrom, supra note 14; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
250. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488 (2014)
251. Requiring a warrant does not make police work harder. Graham, 796
F.3d. at 344. A law enforcement officer would only need to acquire more
evidence before infringing on an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV. A law enforcement officer would only be required to
abide by the rules set forth in the Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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mutually exclusive and both can be upheld by simply abiding by the
Fourth Amendment.252
Therefore, this comment proposes that the SCA be revised in
order to conform to the Fourth Amendment. 253 The SCA should be
revised to expand the privacy rights to all stored information held
by third-party service providers. The SCA should not make a
distinction between older and newer stored information. Instead,
the Act should simply state that a search warrant is required in
order to obtain any electronic information stored by the cell phone
service provider. This way, the individuals’ reasonable expectation
of privacy is protected. In accordance with the Fourth Amendment,
law enforcement officials should only obtain cell site location
information, or any other type of electronic information, through a
showing of probable cause and obtaining a warrant. 254
Furthermore, the application of the Third-Party Doctrine
should be excluded from situations involving cell site location
information.255 The Third-Party Doctrine should only be applied in
situations when the individual has voluntarily provided
information to a third party.256 This was not the case in Graham
and is oftentimes not the case with cell site location information,
which is automatically obtained by cell phone providers.257
Individuals have no choice but to allow cell phone providers to
obtain their location information in order for the individual to use
his or her cell phone.258 An individual does not voluntarily give the
information to the cell phone service provider by simply using a cell
phone or signing the cell phone contract.259 In order for the
reasonable expectation of privacy to be waived, there needs to be
more affirmative steps on the part of the individual to satisfy the
voluntariness requirement of the Third-Party Doctrine.260
Therefore, the Third-Party Doctrine should not apply when a cell
phone service provider automatically obtains the cell site location
information. Consequently, there would remain a reasonable
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. The Third-Party Doctrine should be excluded as referenced in the
Stored Communications Act, but also as it applies in other situations regarding
electronic data automatically obtained by a third-party service provider.
256. Graham, 796 F.3d at 340.
257. In Re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600,
611-12 (5th Cir. 2013).
258. A cell phone automatically pings to the nearest cell tower every few
minutes in order to better the service provided to its customers. Id. If an
individual wants to use their phone, then the individual absolutely has to give
the cell phone provider access to this important information. Id. The individual
has no voluntary choice in the matter. Id.
259. Not having a cell phone is realistically no longer an option for
individuals. Graham, 796 F.3d. at 355. Cell phones are an integral part of
individuals’ everyday lives. Id.
260. Id. at 355-56.
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expectation of privacy in information obtained by the cell phone
service provider. Hence, law enforcement officials would still need
a search warrant in order to obtain cell site location information
from cell phone service providers.
The SCA should require warrants in all cases involving
electronic information and the Third-Party Doctrine should be
eliminated in situations involving cell site location information in
order to preserve the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and
ensure an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his or
her cell phone location data.

V.

CONCLUSION

Without a warrant, the search of cell site location information
violates an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from an
unreasonable search. While there are times when a search of the
cell site location information is essential to the preservation of
justice, such justice cannot be achieved if essential individual rights
are regularly thwarted without any reason. Therefore, in order to
deter potential police misconduct and preserve the integrity of the
criminal justice system, the SCA should be revised so that it
requires a search warrant to be issued prior to any search of cell site
location information. Furthermore, the principles of the ThirdParty Doctrine should be excluded from discussions of cell site
location information because individuals do not voluntarily convey
their personal information to a third party. Thus, these individuals
still have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their location.
This comment suggests that these two proposals will help
revive the true meaning of the Fourth Amendment and ensure that
individuals can reaffirm their reasonable expectation of privacy in
the age of cell phones.

